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SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON THE
DEREGULATION OF INSURANCE TO
ADVANTAGE THE WORKING POOR
Maria O'Brien Hylton*
Introduction
The regulatory framework in which employee benefits products
are marketed and consumed by individuals and groups seeking to
reduce exposure to covered events creates a set of background
rules. These rules influence the way in which insurance products
are developed and impact the number of people who will enjoy the
protection these insurance products afford. This means that every
proposal to regulate an employment related insurance product
likely will affect both the quality and quantity of insurance avail-
able to consumers. For example, over the past decade, as the pub-
lic and professionally-interested parties have grappled with the
insurance implications of the AIDS epidemic, the very function of
insurance and, in particular, risk classification, has come into ques-
tion.' Risk classification rules and other regulatory initiatives have
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
1. Because the focus of today's symposium is healthcare resource allocation, I
limit most of my remarks to the market for health insurance products. Much of the
discussion, though, is applicable generally to other insurance product lines. Several
scholars have examined the effects of risk classification in other insurance markets.
For example, Gary Williams has argued that all forms of "territorial rating" (i.e., the
classification by automobile insurers of risk based on geographical location) ought to
be prohibited by state insurance commissioners on the ground that "[t]erritorial rating
has no relationship to individual responsibility. The practice discriminates against
people of color and the urban poor, with the anomalous result that those individuals
least able to pay are assessed the highest rates for a product that the state requires
them to purchase." Gary Williams, 'The Wrong Side of the Tracks': Territorial Rating
and the Setting of Automobile Insurance Rates in California, 19 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 845, 907 (1992). Regina Austin has written that the arguments about risk classifi-
cation reflect the tension between individual mobility and group solidarity. She notes
that the arguments "advanced in the controversy reflect the general regulatory debate
about the extent to which the law should structure the economic sphere so as to pro-
mote either free competition, on the one hand, or social welfare on the other." Re-
gina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 518
(1983). With respect to life insurance, others have taken the position that equitable
considerations require insurers to classify risks and that "[i]nsurers are not concerned
with stereotyping individuals on the basis of whim, prejudice or surmise, but rather
seek to classify them on the basis of factors with statistically demonstrable relation-
ships to the cost of providing coverage." Herman T. Bailey et al., The Regulatory
Challenge to Life Insurance Classification, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 779, 824 (1976).
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important implications for everyone, particularly those residing in
impoverished urban areas. The optimal regulation of employee
benefits, specifically those designed to protect against ill health and
its consequences, has enormously important implications for the
so-called working poor. In many cases the value to low wage em-
ployees of their employee benefits exceeds 15 percent of their total
compensation. 2
This paper examines the important role that various forms of in-
surance play in the total compensation of low wage employees, fo-
cusing in particular on disability and health insurance. Disability
and health insurance share a common purpose of protecting em-
ployees against ill health and/or the inability to work and generate
an income.' This paper evaluates the current regulatory regimes in
which these welfare plans are provided and considers ways in
which meaningful access by the working poor might be enhanced.
The working poor, however, are not limited to urban areas, the
principal focus of this discussion. Nonetheless, urban environ-
ments generally contain large numbers of low wage employees
whose often limited access to medical care constitutes a constant
concern of policy makers. The normative viewpoint of this paper is
2. See SILVERMAN ET AL., EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 18 (3d ed.
1995).
3. With regard to pension plans, it is well documented that few low wage workers
have coverage and even fewer elect to participate. Pension participation data is avail-
able, inter alia, by income, education level, occupation, sex, race, and age. For 1993,
only eight percent of those earning under $10,000 annually were participating in a
private pension plan. For the $10,000 to $14,999 income group, the rate rose to 27
percent; at $15,000 to 19,999 it rose further to 42 percent. The same trend is at work
as education levels increase. In 1988, for example, participation rates were lowest
among both males and females with less than 12 years of schooling. The data for
participation by occupation are consistent: for the period May 1988 through April
1993, professional, managerial, technical, and administrative support - occupations
with relatively high wages - enjoyed high rates (i.e., more than 50 percent) of private
pension participation. Service workers, farmers, and laborers all enjoy rates of less
than 50 percent. In general, at low income levels, women tend to participate in em-
ployer sponsored pensions at higher rates than men. Consistent with their generally
lower income, blacks tend to participate in pensions at lower rates than whites. For
1993, full time white workers had an overall rate of 51 percent; for comparable black
workers, the figure is 44 percent. Finally, age is positively correlated to pension par-
ticipation. In general, younger workers earn less than older ones, which probably
accounts for some of the participation gap. In 1993, only 21 percent of all workers
under the age of 25 participated in a pension plan. Participation peaked at 63 percent
for the 45 to 49 year old cohort; after the age of 50, participation rates slowly decline.
See generally, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PENSION BENEFITS OF AMERICAN WORKERS:
NEW FINDINGS FROM THE APRIL 1993 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, TABLE B1l
(Preview Ed. 1994); see also, Virginia P. Reno, The Role of Pensions in Retirement
Income, in PENSIONS IN A CHANGING ECONOMY Table 2.9 (Richard V. Burkhauser &
Dallas L. Salisbury, eds., 1993).
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as follows: it seeks to understand the ways in which the applicable
regulatory framework might be altered to improve access and cov-
erage. In many cases this implies a move away from government
regulation and toward a regime that will flexibly meet the needs of
the largest number of individuals possible.
I. Some Economics of Insurance
Disability insurance and health insurance should be viewed as
devices for protecting employees against bearing the full weight of
certain occurrences - such as income loss due to injury in the case
of disability coverage and large economic loss due to medical ex-
penses in the case of health insurance. As Kenneth Abraham has
noted, insurance serves many functions, most notably risk transfer,
risk pooling, and risk allocation.4 Risk allocation is critical because
it is the process of identifying risks and determining appropriate
prices for coverage. This process often results in a price structure
that makes coverage unaffordable for low wage workers.
Thousands of non-employment related temporary and long term
disabling injuries affecting low wage workers every year are not
compensable via workers' compensation.' Employees without pri-
vate health insurance and disability insurance frequently face the
twin crises of income loss and enormous bills for medical care.
Only in some cases does a low wage worker with a long term disa-
bility (expected to last at least one year) become eligible for wage
replacements under the public long term disability program cre-
ated by the Social Security Act.6
Why is it that so many low wage workers go without disability
and health insurance coverage? What can be done, given the cur-
rent constraints (political and otherwise), to enhance access to
these products? In order to understand the forces that have coa-
lesced and resulted in unaffordable insurance rates for many, it is
critical to examine the market pressures which push insurers to
classify risks and the laws which attempt to regulate the way in
which the classification process functions. As Abraham and others
have noted, insurance is simply a device for distributing the risk of
4. See generally, KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 2
(2d ed. 1995).
5. Injuries which are expected to result in a disability of less than six months are
normally treated as short term; those expected to last longer (and in any event longer
than a year) are generally classified as long term disabilities. I focus on non-employ-
ment related injuries because work related injuries are typically the province of work-
ers' compensation insurance programs.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1994).
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loss associated with any covered event.7 From the point of view of
the purchaser, insurance permits a risk averse person to shift the
risk of loss from herself to the insurer. The cost of this risk shifting
is the premium.8 Thus, the insured essentially trades a small, cer-
tain cost (the premium) for the risk of a large loss. In many re-
spects, insurance is a product like any other. Its price is a function
of supply and demand; as its cost rises, demand generally declines. 9
This is critical for our analysis today because for many of the urban
working poor, the price of health and disability insurance simply is
prohibitive. 10
In a competitive insurance market, insurers are compelled to en-
gage in risk classification to the extent permitted by law for two
reasons. First, the failure to offer competitively priced products
will cause an insurer to lose attractive, low risk customers to insur-
ers who price coverage commensurate with underlying risk. The
well known Blue Cross example," and the experience of nine-
7. ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 2.
8. Premiums are based on the size and frequency of the insured's expected loss-
i.e., the size of the loss multiplied by its probability. An additional charge is added to
cover the insurer's administrative expenses.
9. See generally, Maria O'Brien Hylton, Insurance Risk Classifications After Mc-
Gann: Managing Risk Efficiently in the Shadow of the ADA, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 59,
70 (1995).
10. A recent report found that almost one in five American adults went without
health insurance during the previous year:
Forty-five percent of the uninsured had trouble getting health care when
they needed it, and more than a third had difficulty paying their medical
bills. More uninsured people ... were reported to a bill collection agency
than were given free or discounted care. Even people with insurance
weren't fully protected. Eleven percent could not get the medical help they
needed; 12 percent had problems footing their bills. The ... statistics point
to "millions of individual crises" in getting and paying for health care.
Health Care: 'Millions of Individual Crises', U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 4, 1996,
at 12.
The chart accompanying this story reports that the main reason given for the lack of
health insurance by survey respondents was "too expensive" by 55 percent of those
polled, followed by "no employer coverage" with 10 percent and "change in jobs"
with nine percent. Id.
11. In 1933, when Blue Cross was established, premiums were assessed using a
community rating standard. That is, premiums were the same for all subscribers in
the group without regard to the actual experience of the group. Years later, Blue
Cross was forced to switch to experience rating in the face of fierce competition from
for-profit insurers which lured away many low-risk customers by classifying them sep-
arately and charging a lower premium. Community rating results in a situation in
which low-cost (i.e., relatively healthy) customers subsidize high cost customers. In a
non-competitive market, this situation can persist indefinitely-the low-cost custom-
ers have nowhere else to go. In a competitive market, though, this situation is volatile
and ultimately fatal to the practice of community rating.
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teenth century "assessment societies" demonstrate this point. 2
Second, adverse selection (which occurs when those who know or
expect their losses to be unusually high join an insurance pool in
unusually large numbers) drives insurers to classify. Adverse selec-
tion is the direct result of consumer self-interest; the corollary is
that those who know or expect their losses to be low leave the
group or decline to join altogether. Beam and McFadden provide
the following examples:
Employees who are likely to have claims tend to pick benefits
that will minimize their out-of-pocket costs. For example, an
employee who previously selected a medical expense option
[from a cafeteria plan] with a high deductible might switch to a
plan with a lower deductible if medical expenses are ongoing.
An employee who previously rejected dental insurance is likely
to elect this benefit if dental care is anticipated in the near
future. 13
Risk classification can take three basic forms: rating, coverage,
and underwriting.'4 Rating, of special interest here, is the practice
of assigning different premiums (prices) to different risk categories.
Coverage is self evident: an insurer can elect to reduce exposure
by reducing the amount of coverage or the number of covered
events. Underwriting refers to an insurer's threshold decision
about whether to accept a potential customer. For example, an in-
surer might refuse to underwrite anyone with a history of intrave-
nous drug use as a way of reducing exposure to claims for AIDS
and AIDS-related illnesses. Using some combination of these
three classification functions, insurers strive to accurately predict
risk and to set premium prices competitively.
The other major factors affecting these risk management prac-
tices are essentially external - legal constraints imposed by the
various state insurance commissioners and legislatures. The Unfair
Trade Practices Act ("UPTA"), which was developed by the Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC") in con-
junction with the insurance industry, states that an insurer is
12. For a discussion of the early "assessment societies" and their community rating
practices, see Jill Gaulding, Race, Sex, and Genetic Discrimination in Insurance:
What's Fair?, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1646 (1995).
13. BURTON T. BEAM & JOHN J. McFADDEN, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 412 (4th ed.
1996).
14. See generally, Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Important to Be
Left to the Actuaries, 19 MICH. J. OF L. REFORM 349, 350 (1986).
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prohibited from engaging in an unfair method of competition or
deceptive acts or practices. 15 Specifically, the Act prohibits:
[m]aking or permitting any unfair discrimination between indi-
viduals of the same class and equal expectation of life in the
rates charged for any contract of life insurance or of life annuity
or in the dividends or other benefits payable thereon, or in any
other terms and conditions or such contract.1 6
Not surprisingly, the challenge in each state has been to deter-
mine which specific practices are unfair and which are acceptable
- all this in the context of an industry that routinely discriminates
in order to compete and avoid adverse selection.
Two competing models of fairness have been advanced in recent
decades. Bailey argues that risk classification has at its core differ-
entiation - the separation of good risks from bad - and that this
function serves the vital interests of both insurers and the insured.
Bailey notes that equity, which is equivalent with "fairness," is not
the same as equality:
The insurance industry has experienced the disastrous results of
treating unequals equally - the financial failure of the undiffer-
entiated assessment system in the United States, in part the re-
sult of a very human rebellion against treating unequals equally.'
Working against the insurance industry's movement toward
more refined risk classification and more equitable treatment of
the insured is a legislative and regulatory trend which would
compel a return to the sort of total equality which marked the
assessment system in its pure form. If, as we believe, the con-
cept of insurance and its multifaceted economic contributions to
our society are worth preserving, this trend must be identified
and analyzed.... [W]e believe[ ] that the civil rights legislation,
constitutional doctrines and substantial portions of the civil
rights movement are addressing unfair discrimination, not dis-
crimination per se. Insurers are not concerned with stereotyp-
ing individuals on the basis of whim, prejudice or surmise, but
rather seek to classify them on the basis of factors with statisti-
cally demonstrable relationships to the cost of providing
coverage. 17
This debate has important implications for the task before us: to
increase access by working poor people to affordable insurance.
The Bailey position suggests, correctly I argue, that the ability of
15. Bailey et al., supra note 1, at 782. By 1960, the Unfair Trade Practices Act had
been adopted in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.
16. Model Unfair Trade Practices Act § 4(g)(1) (Nat'l Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs 1993).
17. Bailey et al., supra note 1, at 823-24.
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insurers to offer properly priced products is negatively affected by
the push toward a kind of formal equality which has marked the
state insurance regulatory regimes for the past forty years. By for-
mal equality, I am suggesting an equality that fails to take into ac-
count actuarially based distinctions which are observable in the
real world. For example, the prohibition against using race to
classify risks, because it is thought to be unfair in some sense,
means that insurers cannot offer blacks the life annuity discounts to
which they are otherwise entitled. It has been true for many years
that whites outlive all other racial groups, including blacks, by as
much as six or seven years.'8 This observed statistical difference
ought to mean, in a properly functioning market (one without state
regulatory interference) that blacks would pay less to purchase a
life annuity product, and more for life insurance. The race-neutral
tables insurers must now rely on do not permit this practice. Also,
as some have suggested, the ban on racial classification appears to
have had the perverse effect of reducing the ability of blacks to
purchase certain kinds of insurance products. "Insurers who could
not charge blacks more for property insurance, for example, chose
not to offer insurance in certain [predominantly black] locales."'19
This redlining practice has not been found to violate race discrimi-
nation bans, since it relies on classifications other than race. This
state of affairs - state regulation aimed at eliminating "unfair dis-
crimination" which makes it harder for the protected group to ob-
tain coverage on any terms - cannot reasonably be described as a
success by any measure.
The other model for applying the "unfair discrimination" stan-
dard is described by Martin J. Katz as one that is hostile to bigotry
or "irrational discrimination."2 By irrational discrimination, Katz
means behavior "generally symptomatic of racial animus [as op-
posed to] rational discrimination [which] is motivated only by fi-
nancial concerns."'" The case for prohibiting classification by race
(which is usually extended to include sex and other sensitive cate-
gories) is generally made in terms of traditional civil rights rhetoric.
In In re November 14, 1989, Non-Group Rate Filing By Blue Cross
and Blue Shield of New Jersey,22 the appellate division considered a
18. See Gaulding, supra note 12, at 1658-59.
19. Id. at 1660.
20. See Martin J. Katz, Insurance and the Limits of Rational Discrimination, 8
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 436, 436-37 (1990).
21. Id. at 437.
22. 571 A.2d. 985 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
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challenge to the rate increase insurers were permitted to charge for
non-group health contracts. The briefs of the amici curiae focused
on two issues: the use of a gender risk factor in the new rating
model and the demographic focus of the model which would per-
mit demographic location to affect premiums.23  The NAACP
Legal Defense Fund argued that this kind of classification "consti-
tutes effective racial discrimination in violation of constitutional
and statutory prescriptions by concentrating the premium burden
on African American residents of this state, a majority of whom
would by reason of relevant demographics, fall into high risk cate-
gories. '24 In other words, the Legal Defense Fund recognized that
there are in fact higher costs associated with insuring certain demo-
graphic locations; its position was that imposing these additional
costs was unfair because demographic location is highly correlated
with race. Under a disparate impact-type theory, drawn presuma-
bly from analogies with Title VII,25 the essence of "unfair discrimi-
nation" is forcing groups that have traditionally been the object of
invidious (or "irrational") discrimination to pay more for insur-
ance, even where the insurer can demonstrate that higher risks ex-
ist. Bailey and others would, of course, argue that treating
unequals (from an actuarial standpoint) equally results in an
equally unfair kind of discrimination against those who are forced
to subsidize the coverage of others.26
Oddly, this debate is central to the question we are grappling
with today, namely, how to expand coverage for health and disabil-
ity insurance products to low income individuals. The dominant
view is the equality model, ascendant since the National Associa-
tion of Insurance Commissioners. The insurers essentially dropped
racial classifications voluntarily in the face of what they thought
might be an even harsher response if they waited any longer.2 7 The
fear that any kind of racial line drawing was somehow suspect ap-
pears to have informed the move away from a practice that, at least
in some instances, should have resulted in lower insurance prices
for racial minorities. I suggest it is time to reevaluate the ban on
racial and other "sensitive" classifications, not because so-called
"irrational discrimination" has disappeared from the marketplace
(I make no such claim), but because a reduction in actuarially use-
23. See id. at 989.
24. Id. at 990.
25. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e to 2000e-17 (1994)
26. See Bailey et al., supra note 1, at 782-84.
27. Id. at 793-94.
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ful categories of classifications raises the cost of doing business and
reduces the amount of insurance available to certain target groups,
namely, racial minorities and high risk consumers. In addition, and
as part of this reevaluation of NAIC's regulations, I will suggest
that there is an additional culprit: ever expanding state mandates
which, in combination with the restraints on risk classification,
have further reduced the amount of insurance available to the
working poor.
H. The Regulatory Response Reconsidered
The present regulatory regime in which insurers operate is char-
acterized by several important features. First, most of the direct
regulation insurers face comes from state legislatures and insur-
ance commissioners, as contemplated by the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. 28 McCarran-Ferguson provides in pertinent part: "[T]he busi-
ness of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be sub-
ject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation
or taxation of such business. ' 29 In addition, it states: "[T]he con-
tinued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business
of insurance is in the public interest, and ... silence on the part of
the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the
regulation or taxation of such business by the several States."3 Fi-
nally, the statute provides that "[N]o Act of Congress shall be con-
strued to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any
State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or
which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance."' 31 The McCarran-
Ferguson deference toward the state role in regulating insurance is
unusual and not without its detractors. 32 For our purposes, the im-
portant aspect of state regulatory regimes is their growing ten-
dency, since the early 1980s, to impose mandates on insurers who
wish to do business within their borders.
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1994).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1994).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994).
32. See, e.g., Mary Anne Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barriers to Increasing
Health Care Access for the Uninsured, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255 (1990); Alan I.
Widiss & Larry Gostin, What's Wrong With the ERISA "Vacuum?": The Case Against
Unrestricted Freedom for Employers to Terminate Employee Health Care Plans and to
Decide What Coverage is to be Provided When Risk Retention Plans are Established
for Health Care, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 635 (1992); Frederick Rose, Congressional Pro-
posals on Insurance Would End Primacy of State Regulation, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5,
1991, at B4 (describing bills introduced in Senate and House).
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An insurance mandate is a directive to include a substantive
term of coverage in a group or individual contract. For example,
many states require insurers to provide coverage for mental health
services, drug addiction, or certain reconstructive surgery proce-
dures. "Mandates typically stipulate that certain benefits be in-
cluded in a group plan, if one is offered. By making insurance
more expensive, minimum coverage rules may price some firms out
of the insurance market. '' 33 Mandates have proliferated over the
past fifteen years for a variety of reasons described below. At the
same time the number of workers whose employers cannot offer
them health insurance coverage has also increased dramatically.
The two phenomena are related.
A. The Politics of State Mandates
There are several now-standard explanations for the growth in
state mandates. First, legislators are often attracted to the mandate
device because, unlike other decisions to provide voters with a new
service, mandates are "free" from the legislature's point of view in
that they do not entail hard decisions with respect to raising taxes.
A legislature can create the illusion of additional services while
avoiding the usual hard choices that accompany any such deci-
sion.34 The second explanation is the "public interest rationale"
and it is put forth by the regulators as a justification for their inter-
ference in the market for insurance. Legislators argue that insurers
and purchasers may unknowingly undervalue the benefits of some
type of care, such as chemical dependency treatment, resulting in a
demand for coverage which is "too low" from a societal perspec-
tive. "[W]ithout mandates adverse selection might occur which
drives up employers' cost of particular coverages .... [A]dverse
selection creates a market shortcoming, which a mandate may be
partially able to correct. '35 Finally, the third, and possibly most
cynical, explanation for the legislatures' enthusiasm for mandates is
that they have the effect of reducing state expenditures by shifting
these costs onto private employers. Mental health mandates pro-
vide the best example. Consider the case of a severely depressed
or suicidal individual without mental health insurance benefits. If
she would normally receive treatment at a state hospital at tax-
33. Gail A. Jensen & Jon R. Gabel, State Mandated Benefits and the Small Firm's
Decision to Offer Insurance, 4 J. REG. ECON. 379, 380 (1992).
34. See generally Samuel Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,
19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976).
35. Jensen & Gabel, supra note 33, at 380.
INSURANCE DEREGULATION
payer expense, the legislature can shift these costs onto her private
employer simply by mandating these benefits in contracts for pri-
vate group insurance.
Probably each of these three explanations partially accounts for
the explosive growth in state mandates. From 1979 to 1989, for
example, the number of state mandates more than doubled.36 As
one might expect, the growth in mandates has not escaped the at-
tention of both insurers and employers who purchase the large
group coverage contracts for their employees. Jensen and Gabel's
recent study of state mandates found that for 1985, 19 percent of
noncoverage was directly attributable to state mandates; a mere
three years later, mandates explained an incredible 43 percent of
noncoverage in 1988. 37 What are employers doing? It appears that
some are self-insuring (an ERISA 38-sanctioned device that allows
them to circumvent all state regulation). Others are dropping
health insurance as an employee benefit altogether.
Thus, whatever the intentions of state regulators (honorable or
otherwise), the effect of this push toward increased regulation of
the markets for insurance has been a dramatic reduction in the
amount of employer sponsored insurance available to employees.39
The failure of an employer to offer health and/or disability insur-
ance does not always mean, of course, that the employee does
without.40 Well-compensated employees and independent contrac-
36. Id.
37. Id. at 396.
38. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
39. As many have noted, the increase in state mandates has been accompanied by
d move toward the formation of ERISA risk retention plans by employers large
enough to make self insurance attractive. Small employers, though, have no choice
but to purchase the more expensive group contracts with their attendant mandates or
to forego offering coverage altogether. As Jensen and Gabel note, many are electing
to forego coverage. See generally Jensen & Gabel, supra note 33.
40. Although, in many cases employees who do not have access to group coverage
do go without. A recent study by economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
which looked at the reasons for the decline in the savings rate from 8 percent of
personal income in 1977 to less than 4 percent today concluded that increased con-
sumption has eaten into savings, in particular consumption of medical services which
has risen to 13 percent of personal income from 7 percent in the mid-1990s. This
figure includes direct payments by consumers and expenditures on their behalf by
private insurance plans and government programs such as Medicaid and Medicare.
The problem with this increase in medical services consumption is that employees
have little control over that portion which they "consume" in the form of employer
contributions to health insurance. Lynn Elaine Brown & Joshua Gleason, The Saving
Mystery, or Where did the Money Go?, NEw ENG. ECON. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 15.
[T]he bottom line is that the answer to the question-where did the saving
go?-is medical care. Rising expenditures on medical services are absorbing
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tors and consultants typically have the resources to purchase their
own contracts for coverage. Low wage employees, however, often
do not have disposable income sufficient to enable them to afford
typically high priced individual contracts.4 1 These individuals are
the focus of our symposium today. The conclusion that state man-
dates have directly and negatively affected their ability to obtain
employer sponsored insurance is unavoidable.
B. Specific Proposals
The other salient feature of the regulatory climate for insurance
over the last few decades has been the move - inspired by devel-
opments in civil rights law - away from unfettered risk classifica-
tion. Unfortunately for low wage workers seeking access to
affordable insurance products, this trend has had the same general
effect (a reduction in the amount of insurance available) as the in-
crease in state mandates. Together, the two have created a regula-
tory climate that is at best indifferent, and at worst outright hostile,
to the insurance needs of the working poor.
The case for deregulating the risk classification process necessar-
ily entails an attack on the values articulated in landmark decisions
like City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart42 and
the making of a conscious distinction between decisions motivated
a growing fraction of income. Thus, the saving problem is not about thrift
versus profligacy, good versus bad; rather, it is a competition between two
"goods"-more and better medical care, on the one hand, and more invest-
ment, on the other.
Id. at 25.
41. For a discussion of the reasons why group coverage is less expensive per capita
than individual coverage, see Mark A. Hall, The Role of Insurance Purchasing Coop-
eratives in Health Care Reform, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 95, 98 (1993-94). As I have
noted in a previous work:
Employers with relatively small numbers of employees face special pricing
problems when they enter the market and attempt to purchase insurance.
Health insurance, for example, is considerably more costly for small groups
and individuals than for large employers. This is because small group per-
enrollee marketing costs are higher (a large, one-time fee to cover the cost
of marketing the plan to an employer must be divided among fewer group
members); small groups probably have less ability to bargain for advanta-
geous rates; and the small group risk pool is smaller, which requires higher
premium rates. Concerns about possible adverse selection effects are more
pronounced in small groups as well.
Maria O'Brien Hylton, Insurance Risk Classification After McGann: Managing Risk
Efficiently In the Shadow of the ADA, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 59, 71 (1995).
42. 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (concluding that the use of gender-based actuarial tables
in an employer-sponsored pension plan violates the Title VII prohibition against sex
discrimination).
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by bigotry and racial animus and the neutral use of racial charac-
teristics to identify actuarially-significant distinctions. This is not
an easy task given the nearly hysterical reaction that discussions of
categorizations by race and sex generate. In spite of these certain
difficulties, though, it is probably a worthy task in light of the obvi-
ous need for changes in the regulatory regime to address the sub-
stantial coverage gap affecting so many. Toward that end, I
recommend two proposals for regulatory reform: first, discourage
state mandates and second, permit explicit use of race and other
sensitive risk classifications.
The case for limiting (or severely cutting back if this were politi-
cally feasible) the volume of state mandates is the easier case to
make. It has come as no surprise to ERISA specialists to learn that
employers, faced with mounting costs which are a function of both
increases in the consumption and quality of medical care and insur-
ers' obligations to meet growing state mandates, increasingly look
to control or reduce health insurance expenses. The movement to-
ward self-insurance is directly related to the intensified, micro-
management that the mandates imply. Mandates mean that insur-
ers have lost their traditional flexibility to fashion an insurance
product that meets the needs of an employer and its employees.
By requiring coverage for conditions which may or may not be of
value to group members, mandates have increased the costs of pro-
viding this one-size-fits-all coverage and reduced the amount of
coverage being purchased by employers. In most states an em-
ployer cannot elect to purchase a basic, stripped down group health
plan at moderate cost. Faced with the choice of forming a risk re-
tention pool or dropping the benefit, those employers, which can
afford to do so, self-insure. Those which are too small for self-
insurance to be an attractive option simply drop coverage.
Jensen and Gabel's data, while stark, is not surprising. Policy-
makers must confront the choices before them: continued reliance
on mandates will only result in further reductions in coverage. This
is directly at odds with the stated goals of virtually everyone who
purports to be concerned about the estimated 40 million or so un-
insured persons in the United States. Backing away from man-
dates will mean, of course, that some people will find that
particular medical conditions are not covered by their insurance.
The question is one of breadth versus depth. Mandates provide for
contracts with tremendous depth, but only for a limited portion of
the population. Greater breadth of coverage could be achieved by
19971 699
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIV
permitting less depth and allowing employers and insurers to figure
out how much basic coverage they can afford at a given price.
The case for permitting the unfettered practice of risk classifica-
tion, especially when it involves the "sensitive" categories of race
and sex, is more challenging because of the deep suspicion these
classifications rightly engender. No reasonable person could deny
the pernicious history of irrational discrimination and, indeed, its
lingering influence on American society. It would be a mistake
though to let this history preclude even a preliminary consideration
of the benefits that risk classification confer generally. Few would
quibble with the notion that people who engage in risky behavior
ought to see that risk reflected in the cost of any insurance cover-
age they may seek to obtain. Risk loving teenage males who want
automobile insurance, smokers who want health insurance, and
owners of real estate with a history of suspicious arson claims on
previous dwellings who want homeowners insurance all are subject
to risk classification procedures that either result in relatively
higher premiums, outright exclusion, or reduced coverage. Most
are comfortable with these outcomes, assuming the underlying ac-
tuarial data properly justifies them.
Separating the smokers from the non-smokers, or the risk lovers
from the risk averse is, in essence, no different from separating out
women from men or blacks from whites, again assuming the data
support these classifications.43 There is no stigma associated with
being, for example, black or Hispanic and thereby belonging to a
group which tends to have a lower life expectancy than whites.4 4 It
is the simple fact of a distinction in life expectancy that concerns
the insurer.45 The insurer is emphatically unconcerned with why
the distinction exists or who is to blame for it. These inquiries
might well implicate the effects of irrational discrimination. The
insurer simply seeks to incorporate this demonstrable fact into its
calculations in order to offer the fairest possible premium price,
43. The Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994), pro-
hibits discrimination "against a qualified individual with a disability because of the
disability in regard [to] employee compensation [and] other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. §12112(a). So long as an employee or plan
sponsor does not use risk classification as a "subterfuge to avoid the purposes of" the
Act, it is free to establish a bona fide plan and classify risks. 42 U.S.C. §12201.
44. The distinction does not even have any personal predictive power, in that no
particular member of any of these groups can say anything definitive about their own
life expectancy absent an intention to commit suicide or a diagnosis of terminal
illness.
45. See Bailey et al., supra note 1, at 823-27.
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i.e., one that accurately reflects the likelihood and size of an ex-
pected loss.
Some have suggested that unisex annuity tables of the sort at
issue in Manhart4 6 or uni-racial tables have the advantage of shift-
ing the focus away from the inappropriate subjects of race and sex.
This may be true in the context of public accommodations and em-
ployment, where the focus is properly on the equality of all citizens
and job performance, respectively. It is nonsensical, however, in
the insurance context where everyone benefits from accurate pric-
ing and risk assessment. The risky driver who pays more for auto-
mobile insurance either drives more carefully or does not drive at
all. In either case, the rest of us benefit from his added care or his
decision to take the bus. The same analysis applies if the classifica-
tion is based on sex or race. Even though these characteristics are
immutable and one cannot move from one to another, there is
nothing inherently unfair or inappropriate with avoiding the subsi-
dies that unisex and uni-race tables create. Insurers that cannot
explicitly take the higher costs of insuring certain racial minority
populations into account will rationally choose to avoid coverage
where possible. It is hard to see how a dramatic reduction in the
availability of insurance is preferable to a regime in which insur-
ance is available at a cost that accurately reflects the size and fre-
quency of expected losses.
Conclusion
I do not expect that a return to the use of explicit racial (and, by
extension sexual) classifications will be warmly welcomed as a step
in the right direction. On the contrary, I recognize that the process
of classification itself is an anathema to many, and that racial classi-
fications have many negative associations. For those who can ac-
cept the appropriateness of the classification of risks in certain
contexts such as automobile insurance, I suggest only that the anal-
ysis can be usefully extended to other areas.
My claim about the destructive effects of state insurance man-
dates is one that is supported by empirical work and an enormous
amount of legal anecdotal evidence. It is hard to accept that well-
intentioned regulatory efforts have gone awry (although this is not
uncommon). A persistent refusal, though, to recognize state man-
dates as a major cause of the drop in employer-sponsored health
and disability group insurance plans demonstrates a basic indiffer-
46. 435 U.S. 702, 704-11 (1978).
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ence to the needs of millions of uninsured. Moving away from a
regime dominated by mandates would free employers and insurers
to fashion contractual arrangements that suit their particular needs
and result in broader, yet shallower coverage. This arrangement
might not be ideal in every sense, but it would certainly be prefera-
ble to the status quo which flatly excludes millions from any cover-
age at all.
